The ‘problem of problem choice’: A model of sequential knowledge production within scientific communities cientific communities. by Nicolas Carayol & Jean-Michel Dalle
The ‘problem of problem choice’:
A model of sequential knowledge
production within scientiﬁc communities
Nicolas Carayolθ∗, Jean-Michel Dalleβ
θ BETA, UMR CNRS 7522, Université Louis Pasteur,
61, avenue de la Forêt Noire, F-67085 Strasbourg Cedex
β Université Paris 6 and IMRI - Université Paris Dauphine
∗ Corresponding author: Tel: +33(0)390242104 - Fax: +33(0)390242071
<carayol@univ-tlse1.fr>
1Abstract
In this paper we present an original model of sequential problem choice within
scientiﬁc communities. Disciplinary knowledge is accumulated by solving problems
emerging in a growing tree-like web of research areas. Knowledge production is
sequential since the problems solved generate new problems that may be handled.
The model allows us to study how the reward system in science inﬂuences the
scientiﬁc community in stochastically selecting at each period its research agendas,
and the long term resulting disciplines. We present some evidence on a decrease in
the generation of new areas, a path dependency in specialization, and circumstances
under which collapsing dynamics arise.
Key words: Sequential Problem Choice; Stochastic Process; Tree; Graph Theory;
Scientiﬁc Knowledge; Academics; Reward System
JEL classiﬁcation: A12; C63; H40; O30
2Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank R.K. Merton for having let them read an unpublished
manuscript written with R.C. Merton, for his comments on an earlier version of the paper,
and for having helped us track the sources of the “problem of problem choice in science”.
P.A. David should also be strongly acknowledged for his helpful comments at diﬀerent stages
of our work. The technical and non technical comments of A. Kirman were also very useful.
A preliminary version of this paper was presented at the WEHIA Conference (5th Workshop
on Economics with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents, GREQAM, Marseille, June 2000 15-
17th), at the CREREG (University of Rennes 1) seminar , and at the LIRHE (University of
Toulouse 1) seminar, under the title: “Science wells: The ‘problem of problem choice’ within
scientiﬁc communities”. A connected version was presented at the NPR-net conference
(‘Rethinking science Policy: Analytical Frameworks for evidenced based policy’, SPRU,
Brighton, March 2002), and at the EGOS conference (European Group for Organizational
Studies conference, July 2001 5-7th, Lyon), under the title “Science-industry relations and
Scientists’ problem of problem choice”. We would like to thank the participants of these
seminars and conference sessions for useful comments and remarks. Remaining errors are
ours.
31 Introduction
Nelson (1959) and Arrow (1962) were the ﬁrst to highlight that the speciﬁc characteristics
of knowledge considered as a public good result in a default in knowledge creation incentives.
Consequently, the level of private investment in knowledge creation is below its optimal level.
This very well known result appeared as a theoretical justiﬁcation for public support of research
which may (non exclusively) be undertaken by funding a speciﬁc social institution, namely the
academia. In that respect, modern countries obviously support a network of public laboratories
and academic researchers. Even if some econometric works have indeed shown that the social
returns from public research could be quite high1, economists naturally have begun to wonder
about the microeconomic properties of the academic institution. To do so they relied on the
initial contributions of the Sociology of Science. According to the early work of its founder
R.K. Merton, the functioning of the academic institution, that he labels Open Science, relies
on four “institutional imperatives”, namely “universalism, communism, disinterestedness, and
organized skepticism” (Merton, 1942). As argued later, these norms generate a set of eﬀective
rules which stress a speciﬁc reward system, in which priority is essential (Merton, 1957). The
incentive mechanism at play may be sketched as follows. Peers collectively establish the validity
and novelty of knowledge produced (peer review). The attribution of rewards is based on
recognition by peers of the “moral property” on the piece of knowledge produced which increases
the producer’s reputation within the community (“credit”). Using these notions, Dasgupta
and David (1994) have recently synthesized in an economic fashion the mechanisms at play
within academia. They highlighted that its functioning has two fundamental and original
economic properties. First of all, it avoids some of the asymmetric-informational problems
that might otherwise arise between funding agencies and scientists in public procurement of
advanced knowledge: scientists themselves are certainly the most able to carry out veriﬁcation
and evaluation operations in the peer-review like procedures. Secondly, since it is precisely the
very action of disclosing knowledge which induces the reward (reputation or credit increase),
the reward system thus creates simultaneous incentives both for knowledge creation and for
its early disclosure and broad dissemination within the community. That is why this mode of
1For a recent and complete survey see Salter and Martin (2001).
4knowledge production has been said to have very interesting eﬃciency properties (Arrow, 1987)
a n de v e nt oc o n s t i t u t ea“ ﬁrst best solution” for the appropriability problem (Dasgupta and
David, 1994) as it solves the dilemma between knowledge creation incentives and knowledge
disclosure incentives (Stephan 1996)2.
Nevertheless, the mechanisms described above are only part of the story. As a matter of
fact, a very consubstantial feature of the Open Science organization, is the relative freedom
scientists have for deﬁning and selecting their own research agendas. That is the reason why
one may say that Open Science is indeed a decentralized system of knowledge production.T h u s ,
one may wonder how the Open Science reward system inﬂuences scientists’ problem selection i.e.
selection of their research agendas. And that issue is far from being marginal from scientists’
points of views: not all problems are the same in their eyes. Though competition between
scientists is clearly important, associated with “winner-takes-all” rules and “waiting and racing
games” issues (Dasgupta and David, 1987; Reinganum, 1989), it is only second, while the ﬁrst
and most important decision a scientist has to take is the choice of which research area he
or she will investigate, of his own research agenda (Dasgupta and Maskin, 1987). How the
reward system aﬀects problem selection is also crucial for society because it certainly shapes
the pace of scientiﬁc knowledge production. In wondering about the economic properties of the
research agenda determination process within Open Science we are meeting the issue which is
usually referred to in the sociology of science as the “problem of problem choice” (Merton, 1957;
Zuckermann, 1978; Ziman, 1987)3. The only ‘economic-like’ contribution to that ﬁeld is the one
of Merton and Merton (1989) who built an optimal control model in which researchers’ eﬀorts
are dedicated to solving a given set of problems. This model aims to compare the decentralized
allocation of research eﬀorts with the optimal one4. Nevertheless, their model is limited to
2Of course, many problems still arise and it is not possible to derive from this statement that the decentralized
allocation of research eﬀorts induced by the speciﬁc reward system of science is per se optimal. This observation
leaves the room for an Imperfect Economics of Science to come (for a ﬁrst investigation see Carayol, 2001).
3The history of this issue began with Peirce (1896) who provided the ﬁrst formal model of the optimal
allocation of research between projects characterized by diﬀerent levels of utility and risk. Merton (1957) ﬁrst
noticed the importance of competition and the reward system on problem choice. Polanyi (1962) suggested that
science is a self-organized and indeed eﬃcient institution for orienting the scientists’ attention and research eﬀorts
in a decentralized manner. He suggested that scientists are guided by an “invisible hand for ideas” - that science
is a well designed social institution because it allows for an optimal allocation of research eﬀorts.
4Unfortunately, this paper which was initially supposed to appear (and announced) in Rationality and Society
in 1989 has been withdrawn from publication at the time. The available version is still uncomplete and most
5situations in which the set of problems to be solved is ﬁxed, the problems are independent5,
and the rewards for solving each of them are exogenously ﬁxed and ex ante speciﬁed.
In this paper we present a dedicated model of the sequential determination of research
agendas and subsequent dynamic knowledge production within open science. The model is
designed to capture two features of the process of collective knowledge creation which are
essential for analyzing scientiﬁc knowledge production within academic communities. They are
the following:
i) the set of problems to be solved is not ﬁxed: rather our aim is to account for the idea
that new problems are generated by previously created knowledge, that is by problems solved
in the past. This observation highlights the sequential nature of knowledge production;
ii) the rewards for solving problems are not exogenously speciﬁed: the allocation of
research eﬀorts on a set of handleable problems at any given period of time is derived from
both the generic motivations of scientists and how they presently anticipate the recompenses
for solving each problem deﬁned according to the speciﬁc reward system in science.
In order to take these two features into account we propose a model using graph theoretical
principles: we assume that disciplines (a term by which we simply mean the accumulated
knowledge of a scientiﬁc discipline) are designed as a web of research areas (i.e. a graph, the
nodes of which are designating research areas)6. The research areas are the unitary level of
scientiﬁc knowledge organization. Each one is simply deﬁned by its location in the graph and
its level of improvement, that is the number of problems that have been solved within that area
(which can also be understood as the past accumulation of knowledge there). For the sake
of simplicity, this web is assumed to be a tree-like graph. Thus we retain the classical, even
if somewhat misleading, representation of scientiﬁc knowledge as a tree of knowledge7.E v e n
if this simpliﬁcation is far from being perfect, it makes it possible to clearly organize areas
results are still unavailable.
5There is no externality: the solution of one problem does not inﬂuence the solving of another problem.
6The initial idea of scientiﬁc knowledge as a web of “theories” is to be found in Kuhn (1962). Even if very
diﬀerent in its conception, see also Weitzman (1998) for one of the ﬁrst contributions ‘discretizing’ knowledge.
7See Machlup (1982) for a history of this notion which dates back to Lull, Bacon and Comte. Some ﬁrst
elements can also be found in Cournot (1861) where the idea of a branching evolution of knowledge in the
sciences and industry is introduced. See also Ziman (1984) for a rationale about its applicability to the usual
scientiﬁcc l a s s i ﬁcation systems.
6according to their level of specialization, through their geodesic distance to the root which is
assumed to be the locus of the most general knowledge. The set of already existing research
areas (nodes) and possible ones, their structure and their respective levels of improvement,
altogether constitute the present state of the discipline. According to the sequential character
of knowledge production highlighted in i), the state of the system is assumed to directly give
the set of attainable problems at each period: solving the next problem to hand on the existing
research areas or exploring new research areas. The latter is modeled by introducing the
opportunity that any already improved research area leads to the potential creation of a new
research area (which one could view as a new leaf of the tree) by solving its ﬁrst problem.
Thus the remaining issue, stated in ii), becomes - in the context of our model - how agents
strategically allocate their research eﬀorts over the set of handleable problems. Their choices
are obviously mainly a function of the net expected reward for solving each. In science, the
rewarding process is reputation based: scientists seek after “credit”. It is known that such
symbolic rewards are positively correlated with monetary ones (Stephan, 1996). To get such
rewards scientists should attract other scientists attention by producing what Cohen et al.
(1998) call “foundational knowledge”. Thanks to the new computing techniques and availabil-
ity of large scientiﬁc database, citations are now often used as a common weighting parameter
of the importance of scientiﬁc contributions8. In addition to publications, scientists’ CVs are
increasingly mentioning the number of citations they received9. All this suggests that scientists
clearly try to anticipate such expected returns of their marginal research eﬀorts while choosing
their research agendas. It opens the door to considering scientists, while choosing their research
agendas, as ‘credit seekers’. In order to capture that, we introduce a speciﬁc reward function
determining how agents associate at a given moment in time an expected reward to each attain-
able problem. Incentives to performing research on research areas are assumed to be a function
of three variables that have been highlighted by the empirical literature on problem choice in
science10.T h eﬁrst variable indicates how much the research associated with a given problem
8However, citation counts should be taken carefully especially if one wishes to compare the quality of papers
appearing in diﬀerent ﬁelds.
9This kind of reward is crucial, because it is encouraging scientists to spend more time and support higher
risks that important but diﬃcult problems induce, just because they are anticipating that their results will be
widely used and cited, then that they may consequently be highly rewarded for their eﬀorts.
10See Debackere and Rappa (1994), and Rappa and Debackere (1993) for systematic explorations of problem
7is pioneering which is obtained by computing the number of problems already solved so far
in the research areas considered. The second variable is the level of specialization of research
derived by computing the research areas’ distance to the most general area (the root). The
third variable relates to the audience of research areas. It is to be understood as the expected
volume of further research that may refer to a scientiﬁc contribution appearing in a given area.
Since scientiﬁc papers tend to cite papers belonging to the same or to connected areas, we will
assume that the audience of a research area is linearly increasing with the size of the associated
sub-ﬁeld. Our tree-like representation allows us to simply deﬁne the size of an area sub-ﬁeld as
the size of its associated sub-tree11.
L a s t l y ,w h a tw en e e d e di sa ninstantaneous aggregation procedure, so as to infer collective
outcomes from individual choices (Kirman, 1992): we introduce a simple probabilistic rule
which gives the instantaneous allocation of eﬀorts over the research areas given the relative
incentives, which in turn generate the eﬀective ‘arrival’ of knowledge at each period of time.
This rule is also designed to capture the idea that the concentration of competitive pressure
on the most rewarding areas may also inﬂuence the dynamics12. Altogether, one obtains a
stochastic process that inter-temporally aggregates scientists’ eﬀorts and leads to the growth of
the discipline (the tree). This original process is denoted by
©
Tt |t =1 ,...,τ
ª
. Since it is based
on dynamic growing trees, this process has some common features with the Bienaymé-Galton-
Watson branching process in applied mathematics (Kulkarni, 1995), the growing literature on
tree indexed processes in Probability (Lyons and Peres, 2001) and the avalanches literature
in Physics (for an application to economics, see Plouraboue et al., 1998)13. Since this is a
process leading to complex dynamics, its properties are analyzed using standard Monte Carlo
experiments. Our main results are that the process exhibits path dependency (David, 1985)
choice by recording, over a long period, scientists’ entry choices in an emerging ﬁeld and by surveying their
motivations.
11Here lies one important justiﬁcations for the tree structure: focusing on incentives (problem choice) the
tree-like structure captures most of the dynamics principles governing research eﬀort allocations and thus the
growth of knowledge. We are indebted to a referee for having strongly encouraged us to clarify this point.
12This idea has been introduced in Merton (1957) and Merton and Lewis (1971), surveyed by Zuckerman
(1978) and some way discussed in the model of Dasgupta and Maskin (1987).
13The process of research agenda determination within science, since it is marked by sequential interdependent
decisions as today’s decisions to investigate a given research area will obviously be inﬂuenced by former decisions,
h a sc l e a r l ys o m e t h i n gi nc o m m o nw i t ht h einformation cascades litterature (Bikhandani et al, 1991; Barnejee,
1990).
8especially with regard to the level of specialization of knowledge: disciplines that are more
specialized have a higher chance to become even more specialized. We also ﬁnd that there is
a decline in the generation of new research areas over time which, as we will show, can be
compensated by increasing the rewards for performing pioneering research. We also study how
the outcoming disciplines are shaped through tuning the various typical incentives of the Open
Science rewarding process. Finally, an extension of the model enables us to show that a high
intertemporal correlation of choices leads the creation behavior to collapse through a phase
transition-like phenomenon.
The paper is organized as follows. The model is developed in the next section. The third
section is dedicated to the study of the generic properties of the process, while the fourth section
studies parameters eﬀects on the dynamics and discuss the characteristics of the outcoming
disciplines. The ﬁfth section introduces intertemporal correlation and analyzes its consequences.
The last section concludes.
2T h em o d e l
We ﬁrst deﬁne the disciplines, seen as more or less improved research areas organized as
nodes in a tree-like web. Next we discuss and show how these disciplines generate a set of
problems that can be handled given the present state of knowledge. Thirdly we introduce
an expected reward function which provides the incentives associated with solving each of
the available problems. Finally we present the probabilistic function implementing scientists’
choices at each period and thus the advances of scientiﬁck n o w l e d g e .
2.1 Scientiﬁc disciplines
At each period t of the discrete time, let a scientiﬁc discipline be described as an undirected
graph Gt. A graph is formally deﬁned as a double set: Gt ≡
©
V t,Etª
,w h e r eV t is the set of
the nodes (i) (vertices) of the graph and Et is the set of the edges (ij) of the graph. Any edge
(ij) ∈ Et is a link between the two nodes (i) and (j) belonging to the set of nodes: (i),(j) ∈ V t.
9We represent scientiﬁc disciplines as ‘knowledge trees’ where nodes designate diﬀerent but
interdependent research areas. Substantially, the root corresponds to the most general research
area, while ‘lower’ nodes correspond to more specialized areas of knowledge. Since we consider
trees, the extra properties follow:
- the graph is connected, i.e. there is a path relating each pair of nodes of the graph :
∀ (i) and (j) ∈ V t, ∃ ap a t h{(i,l),(l,u)....,(k,j)} ⊂ Et;
- the graph is minimally connected: there is only one path between any two nodes of
the graph (there is no cycle in the graph). As a consequence, we have a direct correspondence







Moreover, a tree is also a planar graph: it can always be represented on a plan without
any crossing between edges. Since there is one and only one path between any two nodes, a
tree has also an unambiguous geodesic distance which is a counting function of the number
of edges of the path connecting two nodes. Thus d(i,j), the distance between the nodes (i)
and (j), is given by: d(i,j) ≡ card{(i,l),(l,y)....,(k,j)}. The root of the graph is a speciﬁc
node denoted (1). The distance to the root d(i,1) can simply be denoted di.T h u s d1 =0 .
The root is assumed to represent the research area with the highest possible level of generality.








denote the sub-tree of Gt (Gt
j ⊂ Gt) the root of which is node (j). Gt
j is
said to be a sub-ﬁeld of the discipline Gt associated to area (j). Thus, we have by deﬁnition
Gt
1 = Gt. The size of the sub-discipline Gt
j is given by st









The tree structure (having also speciﬁed that (1) is the root of the tree) allows us to clearly
deﬁne the following ‘father’ operator, fGt (·):V t∗ → V t, where V t∗ is the set of nodes of the
graph but the root: V t∗ = V t ª (1) 14, which gives the ‘father’ of any of the nodes of V t∗.
Formally we have (i)=fGt (j) i fa n do n l yi fb o t h(ij) ∈ Et and di = dj +1 . The inverse
function: f−1
Gt (·):V t → V t∗, tells us that (j) is in the childhood of (i) if (j) ∈ Ct
i = f−1
V t (i).





i∈V t which assigns to each node of the graph (i) ∈ V t,
14The symbol ª simply indicates that the node considered is removed from the set. By ⊕, it is meant that the
element is added to the set.





∈ N∗,∀i ∈ V t denoting the robustness of knowledge (or its improvement
level) attained within the research area (i) (thus Φt ∈ (N∗)
card{V t}). It is deﬁned as the number
of problems solved in the research area considered.
Together, the set of nodes, the set of edges, and the improvement levels deﬁne the state
o ft h ed i s c i p l i n e( t h es y s t e m )a te a c hp e r i o d ,i.e. the knowledge accumulated so far and its
structure. It is denoted by Tt ≡
¡
V t,Et,Φt¢
2.2 Available research agendas and problems generation
Let us now deﬁne the set of attainable problems given the present development of the
discipline, i.e. the set of potential research agendas that the present state of the system allows
to tackle. As it has been said before, one cannot reasonably assume that the set of problems is
ﬁxed and ex ante speciﬁed, but rather generated and even shaped by the advance of knowledge.
In order to capture that feature, we consider that scientists can either i) improve knowledge in
some already existing research area, or ii) create a new research area from an already existing
one. In other words, the problems that may be solved are either the next problem to hand in
already improved research areas or the ﬁrst problem to be solved of a research area connected
to any already improved one.
In this last respect, we further consider that a new ‘virtual’ node is associated with each
existing one: that is, we consider that scientists are able to create a new and more specialized
research area ‘from’ any existing one. Let Wt be this set of nodes that can be created at period
t:e a c h(j) in Wt is simply a leaf from each node (i) ∈ V t, the improvement level of which is
still null: ∀(j) ∈ Wt : φt






and V t ∩ Wt = ∅.
Let us now deﬁne the set Ot such as: Ot = V t ∪ Wt. It is the set of opportunities, that
is the set of research areas that contain a handleable problem at date t (whether the research
areas have already been improved or not). We also need to deﬁne the graph that covers the
opportunities, that is Λt ≡
©
Ot,Ftª
such that its set of edges Ft is the union of the set edges
Et (of graph Gt) a n do ft h es e to fe d g e ss a yIt that is binding each node of V t to one distinct
node of Wt : Ft ≡ Et∪It. The deﬁnition of the tree-like graph Λt, having (1) as its root, allows
11us to rigorously deﬁne the set Wt, which is formally such that both i) ∀(j) ∈ Wt,∃ one and
only one (i) ∈ V t, such that (i)=fΛt (j);and ii) ∀(i) ∈ V t, ∃ one and only one (j) ∈ Wt such
that (j)=f−1
Λt (i).
We assume that the state of the system simply evolves by selecting one node among the




Formally, when a node is selected, the two following events transform the state of the system:
i) 
      








=( l) ∈ Wt then
V t+1 = V t ⊕ (l);Wt+1 = Wt ª (l) ⊕ (k) ⊕ (h)




ot +1 ( 1 b)
(1a) says that if the chosen research area is an already improved one ((i) ∈ V t), the set of
nodes and potential ones are left unchanged. If the chosen node is a new one ((l) ∈ Wt)i ti s
then added to the set of already improved nodes, while it is withdrawn from the set of potential
ones. In the meantime, two new elements are added to that set. The ﬁrst one (k) is the new
research area that may now be attained because of the initial improvement of (l): (k)=f−1
Ot (l).
The second one, (h), replaces (l) within the set of potential areas. Formally, if node (u) was
such that (u)=fOt (l), then (h) is such that: (h) ∈ Ct+1
u = f−1
Ot (u) with (h) 6=( l). This feature
of the model, traduces an implicit assumption of the model, namely that there is no scarcity
in potential research areas. Each new investigation solving a problem generates new questions
both inside its research area and in new areas.
(1b) says that the level of improvement of the chosen research area is improved by one
unitary increment. One can thus verify that the level of improvement of each node is equal to




with Γ(·,·) deﬁned such that: Γ(x,y)=1if x = y and 0 otherwise.
An example of such a process is represented in Figure 1 when starting with only one node
at period 1 (the root). The numbers on each node are the levels of improvement φt
i (number
12of problems solved there), and the dotted lines represent possible areas that may be created
i.e. virtual nodes. When one denotes each node by an integer which is increased by a unitary
increment at each arrival, then the evolution of the tree described in Figure 1 can be formally
w r i t t e na si nT a b l e1 .
       1                       1
                            1
   1     2
    1
    2
    1    1    1
   1
   1    1     1
   1
     2
    2
t       1   2     3           4           5   6
Figure 1. An example for the evolution of a knowledge tree over the ﬁrst 6 periods of time.
t Vt Et Φt Wt Ot ot
1 {1} ∅ (1) {2} {1,2} {2}
2 {1,2} {(1,2)} (1,1) {3,4} {1,2,3,4} {3}
3 {1,2,3} {(1,2),(1,3)} (1,1,1) {4,5,6} {1,2,3,4,5,6} {1}
4 {1,2,3} {(1,2),(1,3)} (2,1,1) {4,5,6} {1,2,3,4,5,6} {4}
5 {1,2,3,4} {(1,2),(1,3)(3,4)} (2,1,1,1) {5,6,7,8} {1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8} {2}
6 {1,2,3,4} {(1,2),(1,3)(3,4)} (2,2,1,1) {5,6,7,8} {1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8} −
Table 1. The evolution of the tree like graph described in Figure 1.
2.3 Incentives and motivations for problem choice
We now tackle the question of the incentives that may lead researchers to select projects
among the available ones, that is the way the reward system in science deﬁnes an implicit payoﬀ
function for problem choice at each period. For that purpose we introduce a reward function
ω(·,·,·) that associates a given expected reward ωt
o to each possible problem (o) ∈ Ot at any










o has been deﬁned as the level of robustness of the research area, i.e. the sum of past
accumulation of knowledge on (o). When (o) corresponds to a new research area, then still no
knowledge has been accumulated and thus φt
o =0 .d o which is the distance to the root (let us
recall that do ≡ d(o,1)) indicates the level of specialization of the research area considered (o).
When do is low, the research area is general while if do is high, (o) tends to be specialized15. st
o
is the size of the sub-discipline Gt
o associated with the research area (o). If (o) is a new research
area then obviously, st
o =0 .s t
o is a proxy for the “audience” associated with research areas (o).















¢γ (with γ such that γ<0) stands for a measure of the relative rewarding of
problems in academic publications depending on their novelty. The higher φt
o the less original
the next problem solved there and therefore the lower the associated reputation gain (because
γ<0). The reward of the nth contribution to a given research area is only a fraction of the ﬁrst




¢γ tends to highly decrease when φt
o increases (especially
when φt
o is still small). On the contrary, when γ is close to 0, the decreasing slope is lower.
Thus when γ is close to 0,t h eﬁrst problems solved within a given research area tend to be
relatively as rewarded as the later ones, while when γ is much lower than 0, pioneers will be
much more rewarded than later contributors.
The second component of expression (3), namely (1 + do)
λ , stands here for a measure
of the relative rewarding for producing knowledge in a given area depending on its general-
ity/specialization. This parameter is typically inﬂuenced by the role of experiments, but also
by the diﬃculty to perform valid research either because of its inherent complexity or because
access to high-level equipments is needed. Parameter λ is assumed to be positive (λ>0), which
implies that the reward is always higher for specialized areas. This feature may appear counter-
intuitive at ﬁrst glance. Nevertheless, the more general a research area, the more diﬃcult it is
15I ti sas p e c i ﬁc and constant attribute of the research area considered, independent of the time period con-
sidered. Thus the time period superscripts have been removed.
14to perform research there and the lower the expected reward of a standardized unit of eﬀort. λ
controls the relative preference/rewarding for specialized research areas.




¢δ measures the impact of the
audience of research areas on the expected rewards. When the associated sub-discipline is big,
i.e. is composed of a large number of research areas, then the research results that may appear
in such a research area are more likely to be frequently cited. The parameter δ (such as δ>0)
expresses the relative importance of that factor in the reward system, that is the strength of
the citation system (or even the ‘vertical’ integration of the discipline). When δ → 0, the size of
the sub-tree of area (o) tends to have no more any eﬀect on the expected rewards ωt
o.T h em o r e




¢δ becomes an important element of the rewards (st
o
becomes critical).
2.4 Sequential discrete choices and the stochastic process
As we emphasized before, science has a speciﬁc incentive structure which inﬂuences the de-
termination process of research agenda by rational scientists and therefore collective outcomes.













o =1 , ∀t and α (α>0). α stands for the concentration of scientists’ attention
on the most rewarding areas for a given allocation of incentives over the handleable problems.
For instance, when α<1, the less rewarding research areas tend to be selected ‘more fre-
quently’. On the contrary, when α>1, the more rewarding areas tend to be selected more
than proportionally to their expected rewards, while less rewarding areas tend to be chosen less
than proportionally. As α →∞the node associated with the highest reward is almost surely
chosen, and the system becomes ‘quasi-deterministic’. On the contrary, when α → 0,e a c h
possible opportunity is chosen with the same unique probability: pt
o → pt,∀t and (o) ∈ Ot.
Introducing equation (3) in equation (4) gives us the probability that any research area











































































































































































This closes the description of the stochastic process of knowledge generation within dis-
ciplines. Formally, we obtain a stochastic discrete time inﬁnite space state process that we
denote by
©







since it describes the evo-
lution through time of the two sets V t, and Et, and the vector Φt. Figure 2 shows three
dynamically grown trees that have resulted from diﬀerent numerical experiments realized with
such a stochastic process.
Together, the parameters (λ,δ,γ,α) w h i c ha p p e a ri ne q u a t i o n(5) are said to characterize
an academic community and its associated reward system. α stands for the problem choice
practice given the incentives. λ, δ,a n dγ give the relative weighting of the various types of
incentives whether this weighting comes from the motivations of the agents or from the eﬀective
rewarding. In practice both may be very close since academic communities are, to a large extent,
self-organized in the sense that agents are both the rewarded and the rewarding agents.
3 Generic properties of the process
We now turn to an exploration of the generic properties of the system, that is the behavior
of the dynamic process through time and its limit behavior, while the characteristics of the
drawn trees depending on parameters values are described in the next section. As it has been
said above, the system
©
Tt |t =1 ,...,τ
ª
is a quite complex one which naturally leads to complex
dynamics. To make that point clear, let us consider the following. From equation (5), it can






∂φi < 0; under the assumptions
made previously about the parameters value spaces (γ<0,δ>0;λ>0 and with α>0). This
implies that, all things equal, more specialized research areas, new research areas and research
areas with larger audience are more attractive to scientists’ choices. The problem is that these
variables are dynamically correlated because the specialization and the audience variables are
often opposite and because the robustness levels (φi) act as a ‘crowding out’ variable which
tends to re-allocate incentives through time over the population of research areas (while it also
17regulates partly the creation of new ones). In order to analyze the complex behavior of the
system, we mostly rely on Monte-Carlo simulation experiments. All experiments that will be
presented in the remaining of the paper start with a tree reduced to its root at period one
(V 1 = {(1)};E1 = ∅;Φ1 =( 1 ) ).
Among the various features of the system’s behavior that one may wish to consider, we are
particularly interested in the evolution of the two following ones: the generation of research
areas (vs. the improvement of existing ones), and the specialization of scientiﬁck n o w l e d g e
(that is how far from the root the problems solved are located). The two sub-sections below
tackle these issues successively.
3.1 The inexorable decline of research areas generation
To analyze collective outcomes, it is useful to deﬁne some aggregate measures. Let us deﬁne
the creation index as the number of nodes created over the number of possible node creations






Obviously, this index is such that 0 ≤ ςt ≤ 1, because there is at the most one creation per
period. ςt may also be called the exploration index because it capture the past ability of the
community to explore new scientiﬁcp a t h s .
O n eh a st os e et h a tt h e r ei sar e a lt r a d e - o ﬀ between creation/exploration and robustness,
because any eﬀort which is not dedicated to the creation of a research area is dedicated to the






i; is the inverse of the creation index: ¯ φ





Figure 3 presents ten identical runs of the dynamic process, recording at each period the
creation index ςt, the parameters being arbitrarily ﬁxed. Many other numerical experiments
with diﬀerent values of the parameters have been run, all showing that creation decreases with
time. We have also run experiments over very long periods showing that the creation index was
18still decreasing after 10,000 periods. A unique but important exception arises when α =0that
is when the evolution probabilities are equal at each period. In such a situation, it can easily







1 43 85 127 169 211 253 295 337 379 421 463 505 547 589 631 673 715 757 799 841 883 925 967
Figure 3. Time series of the creation index ςt over 1000 periods. 10 identical runs with:
δ = λ = −γ =1 , α =4
This general result, is a simple but not so obvious consequence of the fact that knowledge
improvements are rewarded by the attention of other scientists, often measured (even if very
imperfectly) by counting citations received: the more a scientiﬁc discipline grows, the higher
the incentives for improving knowledge in existing research areas just because their audience
(sub-tree size) is relatively increasing as compared to incentives for exploring new paths.
3.2 General vs. specialized disciplines: a path-dependent outcome
Let us deﬁne the average generality of knowledge index, as the sum of the robustness levels
of all research areas, weighted by their level of generality (the inverse of the specialization level:











This index gives the average generality of each problem solved so far, which we can say is
the average level of generality of knowledge within the discipline considered. Like the creation
19index, this index is such that: 0 ≤ ˜ φ
t
≤ 1,w i t h˜ φ
t
close to 1 (to 0) when problems solved have
been highly general (specialized).
Figure 4 presents 10 identical numerical runs of the process recording at each period the
evolution of the knowledge specialization through the index ˜ φ
t
, all parameters being ﬁxed. It
startingly shows that this is decreasing through time. This feature is robust to modiﬁcations
of the parameters values. The explanation for such a result is quite obvious because, in the
model, it is precisely the past exploration behaviors at specialized levels that allow agents to


























































































































Figure 4. Time series for the specialization of knowledge ˜ φ
t
. Ten numerical experiments
realized over 1000 periods, with parameters ﬁxed as follows: δ = λ = α =1 ,γ= −1.
The other insight that time series may provide has to do with the path dependency prop-
erty, which in dynamic stochastic systems theory simply means that the transitory states of
the system (state variables) determine its limit behavior. Practically, if we ﬁnd that there is
increasing diﬀerences between identical runs of the system (same initial states and same para-
meters values), thus path dependency is said to occur. If diﬀerences tend to diminish, the time
series tend towards a common and unique limit, thus the system is simply auto-regressive and
does not exhibit the path dependency property.
To know which phenomenon occurs, we computed and recorded the variation coeﬃcient
(variance/mean) of the generality index ˜ φ
t
of ten identical runs of the process. As the parameter
20α is likely to be critical in such respect we have done the experiment for diﬀerent values of α.I n
order to see potential qualitative diﬀerences with the creation index, we computed the variation
coeﬃcient for creation index ςt. The results obtained for both ςt and ˜ φ
t
are presented in the




























































































































































Figure 5. Evolution, over 1000 periods, of the variation coeﬃcient of both the creation index
(graph a) and the generality index (graph b) from ten identical runs of the process, computed
for diﬀerent values of α (α =0 ,1,...,6). Numerical experiments realized with ﬁxed values of
the other parameters: δ = λ = −γ =1 .
As one can observe in comparing graphs a and b of Figure 5, one gets very contrasted results
between the path dependency of the system while focusing either on its creation behavior or
on its generality16.T h e v a r i a t i o n c o e ﬃcient of the creation index is clearly very small and
decreasing toward zero as time goes (whatever the value of its parameter α). Thus clearly, the
system does not exhibit a path dependency property when looking at the creation of research
areas. The opposite occurs when one looks at the generality index. Indeed, one can observe
in graph b that the variation coeﬃcient of ˜ φ
t
increases with time, the slope being positively
inﬂuenced by parameter α. Thus the initial events - the ﬁrst choices of where to solve problems
-c a nd u r a b l yi n ﬂuence knowledge production. As a consequence, the dedication of scientiﬁc
disciplines toward applied or more general knowledge can be inﬂuenced not only by their en-
dogenous characteristics but also by the very history of disciplines and the path they toke at
16Recalling that both indexes are comprised between zero and one.
21their beginning. Early pioneers of new scientiﬁc disciplines are therefore responsible for shaping
them and giving them a more or less ‘applied’ turn.
4 Incentives, motivations and the outcoming disciplines: pa-
rameters eﬀects study
A given combination of parameters values provides the exogenously deﬁned relative weight-
ing of the various typical features of Open Science rewarding. As indicated above it is giving
both the speciﬁc motivations of the scientiﬁc community and the eﬀective rewarding practices.
In the following we ﬁrst conduct a dedicated analysis of parameters eﬀects on the outcoming
disciplines through computing their two indexes deﬁn e di ne q u a t i o n s(6) and (7) after a given
long period of time. Next we discuss the generic features of the typical disciplines generated by
opposed values of parameters.
4.1 Parameters study
To get clearer results, we present several simulations according to the following protocol.
First, set α =1 . Then each time one of the three parameters (δ, λ, γ)i sﬁxed while the
two others vary. For each couple of values of the two tuned parameters, we compute the




. Every single point in the graphs presented here (Figure 5) then corresponds to the
values of one index computed for a singular grown tree (thus 400 trees were generated for each
simulation experiment). These 2 × 2 s i m u l a t i o np r o c e s si su s e db e c a u s ei ta l l o w su st oa s s e s s
the robustness of the parameter modiﬁcation eﬀects for various values of the other parameters.
For controling purposes, the same experiments have been reproduced for diﬀerent values of the
ﬁxed parameters. Moreover, the whole experiment has been reproduced with diﬀerent values
of α. As a ﬁrst global result, we found that when α increases the slopes in the indexes due
to modiﬁcations of the other parameters become steeper. Thus the eﬀects discussed below are




























































































































































































































































Figure 5. Creation index ς◦ (left: graphs a, b, and c) and generality index ˜ φ
◦
(right: graphs
d, e and f). Graphs a and d: λ and γ vary, δ =1 . Graphs b and e: δ and γ vary, λ =1 .
Graphs c and f: δ and λ vary, γ = −1. In all experiments, results are observed after 1000
periods and with α =1 .
Table 2 summarizes the main results obtained.
23δ γ λ




Table 2. Eﬀects of the parameters (δ, γ, λ) on the indexes (ς◦, ˜ φ
◦
). A positive eﬀect is
denoted by %, a negative by &, a n dn oe ﬀects by −→.
Both a higher δ and a γ closer to 017 decrease creation: looking for citation rents, academic
scientists tend to prefer improving knowledge within existing areas rather than exploring new
ones, both when the size of the audience (an important sub-tree) counts much and when rewards
for performing pioneering research are lower. Higher δ tends to favor research performed at a
high level of generality because of the following: research areas which are more general are often
(but not systematically) the ones that have the strongest audiences, i.e. research performed
there is likely to be cited by research performed in more specialized but connected areas.
Thus, general areas become naturally more attractive on average. In a similar fashion, since
γ regulates the incentives to dedicate research eﬀorts toward more or less improved research
areas, when it increases it diminishes the creation of research areas and prevents the discipline
from achieving an important level of specialization. That naturally comes from the fact that
the model assumes specialization to result from successive downward exploration. Thus some
pretty general disciplines may in fact be ‘under-developed’ trees, therefrom lower specialization
may be, in certain circumstances, just a consequence of a lack of exploration behaviors. Finally,
higher λ increases the attractivity of more specialized research areas, and therefore the average
distance to the root.
4.2 How motivations and incentives lead to various outcoming disciplines
We have just seen how the features of the outcoming disciplines are inﬂuenced by each
parameter. We now take the opposite point of view, by taking polar forms of the discipline-
trees and wonder how they may be generated? Furthermore: What is their probability of
17Recalling that γ is negative, thus “γ increases” is similar to “γ becomes closer to zero”.
24occurrence because of reinforcing (or opposed) eﬀects of the parameters? And ﬁnally, are these
forms likely to be stable over time considering the generic properties of the process highlighted
in the previous section?
Let us ﬁrst deﬁne the four polar forms of disciplines coming from opposite values of the two
indexes: the ‘star’ form is obtained when the discipline is both highly general and research areas
a r eh i g h l yi m p r o v e d( h i g h˜ φ
◦
,l o wς◦), a ‘well’ form is said to arise when the discipline is highly
specialized and counts only few research areas (low ˜ φ
◦
,l o wς◦), the ‘ﬂake’ form comes from
many creations at a quite general level (high ˜ φ
◦
,h i g hς◦), and the ‘rake’ form stands for both
high specialization and many creations (low ˜ φ
◦






low ς◦ ‘Star’ ‘Well’
high ς◦ ‘Flake’ ‘Rake’
Table 3. The polar forms of the scientiﬁc disciplines.
We have seen that δ and γ play systematically in an opposite manner. Thus, in the one
hand, they can counterbalance each other, in the sense that the parameter values which lead to
specialized (general) disciplines are also the same that prevent their areas to be much improved
(numerous). That makes both the ‘star’ and the ‘rake’ forms quite unlikely to emerge since the
speciﬁc traits of each form are generated by opposed values of the parameters. On the other
hand, they may also reinforce one another. That leads to the idea that the ‘ﬂake’ and the ‘well’
forms are quite probable ones: the factors that orient the disciplines towards being specialized
(general) tend also to orient the research eﬀorts toward being less (more) exploratory.
Nevertheles, as we have seen before, the creation of new research areas is likely to diminish
through time: thus the ‘ﬂake’ forms might be seen as a transitory state of the ‘star’ that may
emerge in the long run: once the community has generated a certain number of research areas,
the relative incentives for improving research areas may overbalance the exploration ones, and
25thus, among the existing areas, the general ones which have a larger audience, become more
attractive. As a matter of fact, the ‘star’ form has much in common with a disciplines such
as Physics, which is an old and fully integrated discipline, which has explored many speciﬁc
and applied areas and where the most theoretical and general discoveries may beneﬁtt oal a r g e
audience dispersed in many specialized research areas.
On the opposite corner, the ‘well’ form seems to be a quite interesting and robust typical
shape of scientiﬁc disciplines since specialization is a path dependent outcome and exploration
tends to decrease. Such disciplines emerge because of weak incentives for performing pioneering
research and weak rewarding of research due to its relative audience. The latter may come from
scientiﬁc communities that would not (or weakly) take citations into account in the evaluation
process as compared to publication counts. In such circumstances, the attention of scientists
may follow one single (or few) line of investigation, while excluding many research opportunities
in a quite ‘autistic’ fashion. Thus, one obtains a major ‘science well’ as illustrated in Figure 6.
Figure 6. A‘ s c i e n c ew e l l ’ .
265 Extension: Intertemporal correlation of choices
In this section we introduce a new feature of the dynamic process, namely an intertemporal
correlation of choices which stipulates that present choices are directly inﬂuenced by previous
ones. Two main rationales motivate that trait. The ﬁrst one has much in common with
what leads scientists to say that a given research areas is ‘hot’. A ‘hot’ research area is often
one where discoveries recently occurred. It has been showed in survey-like studies of problem
choice, that such factor is one of the main reasons that motivates researchers to investigate
scientiﬁc domains (Rappa and Debackere, 1993). That is probably because academic agents
may rationally take recent discoveries as a signal that there is still much to be done there.
Moreover, there is also some anecdotal evidence that support the idea that such ‘hot’ areas
tend to highly attract researchers’ attention even if they are not precisely specialize in that
area. Thus there is more reputation to be gained in such areas audience the audience of which
is temporary increased going beyond the classical boundaries between sub-ﬁelds. The other
justiﬁcation for introducing an intertemporal correlation is due to cognitive specialization of
knowledge production. Knowledge can be considered as having a local character (Stiglitz, 1987)
in the sense that agents do specialize in speciﬁc areas of a discipline. Thus cognitive mobility
is costly, and reallocation of eﬀorts may be quite costly for agents, especially when they have
invested much and when the time to go before retirement is getting shorter (Stephan, 1996).
Thus the problem choices become globally sticky that is the reallocation of eﬀorts due to recent
modiﬁcations in incentives is lowered. In the following we introduce deﬁnitions and subsequent
improvements of the process before presenting the results.
5.1 Deﬁnitions
Let the vector Ψt ⊂ Nm denote the memory of the system at period t. This vector records
the research areas where the m (∈ N) last problems were solved, that is during the m last
periods. Thus this parameter gives the length of the window for the systems memory. The
memory vector is formally deﬁned as: Ψt = {(oτ)}τ=t−m−1,...,t−1, recalling that (oτ) denotes
the research area where a problem has been solved at period τ. This leads to a state of the




27Let us now denote the hotness of any research area (o) at period t by ψt
o, which is deﬁned





oτ∈Ψt Γ(oτ,o)( 8 )
with Γ(·,·) deﬁned in Section 2. Thus, one may label a cold research area as an area
which has had no problem solved during the m last periods, i.e. when ψt
o =0 . Similarly, a
sub-discipline Gt





Now let the incentives for problem choice be modiﬁed by the new variable introduced,













The parameter β (β>0) tells how much agents’ choices are inﬂuenced by the hotness
character of research areas
5.2 A phase transition phenomenon





on the system’s behavior, we let its
associated parameter β vary. A series of numerical experiments has been realized for ﬁxed
values of the other parameters. Some results of such simulations are presented in graphs a and
b of Figure 9. Therein, one may observe that the creation index decreases sharply down to zero
when β increases. Moreover, the generality index appears to increase sharply for a critical value


































































































































Figure 9ab. The max/min/mean values of indexes ς◦ (graph a) and ˜ φ
◦
(graph b) obtained
for diﬀerent values of β. Other parameters: α = δ = λ = −γ =1 ,m=1 0 .
28This properties were reproduced for very diﬀerent values of the parameters. We also studied
t h ep o s s i b l ei n ﬂuence of the memory size parameter (m) and found no evidence of any inﬂuence
on the dynamics.
5C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper we have presented an original model of knowledge production within scientiﬁc
disciplines. It is a graph theoretical model in which knowledge production is sequential. The
main question tackled in the paper is how the speciﬁc incentives provided by the academic
reward system inﬂuence researchers’ problem choice and thus shape the stochastic process of
knowledge generation within scientiﬁc disciplines. Let us sum up the main results obtained.
We ﬁrst found that the process exhibits a sustained decline in the generation of new areas.
This phenomenon is caused by the speciﬁc reward system in science which leads researchers to
seek for others’ attention. When the discipline grows, the relative rewarding of problems located
in already developed ﬁelds increases: because their audience becomes larger, contributions to
such domains are more likely to be cited. This is not to be seen as af o r t i o r inegative: since
more knowledge are likely to be produced in larger domains, present contributions there are
likely to beneﬁt to many late improvements. That is directly connected to the fact that the
citation system traces and rewards knowledge spillovers. Nevertheless, this ﬁrst result suggests
that the rewards for performing pioneering research should be increased when the discipline
grows in order to asymptotically sustain research areas generation. We next found that the
stochastic process exhibits path dependency with regard to the specialization of disciplines.
More specialized disciplines tend to become even more specialized through time. We found
that this property is enhanced when the concentration of scientists’ attention on the most
rewarding areas is stronger.
In addition to these ﬁrst series of results, parameter studies allowed us to highlight the
possible occurrence of a quite ‘autistic’ dynamics leading to a ‘well’ form of discipline having
left many research opportunities unexplored. We found that increasing the relative rewarding of
pioneering research is again a key leverage parameter because, under such circumstances, it also
29(unexpectedly) renders general problems more attractive. We argued that, such a situation is
more likely when the relative rewarding through recording citations is outweighed by publication
counts. Thus, reinforcing the former mechanism may partly prevent from getting such ‘science
well’. Lastly, as empirical evidence suggested, we studied how an intertemporal correlation of
choices may aﬀect the dynamics. We found that the system collapses when such an eﬀect is
high. This suggests that scientiﬁc communities should be prevented from being too sticky in
connection with problem choice and should preserve the collective ability to reallocate eﬀorts
over problems.
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